The February 2021 coup In Myanmar has thrown up a new raft of problems for Thailand and India. The re-assembling of Indian separatist groups in Myanmar, the spillover from armed conflict and the arrival of refugees in Thailand and India are just the tip of the iceberg.

The ongoing anti-coup protests are qualitatively different and pose a bigger challenge to Myanmar’s military rulers than earlier protest movements.

Often viewed as marginal spaces at the edge of a nation, borders are in fact sites of social, political and cultural changethat impact local and national politics. This edited volume underscores this relationship by drawing attention to the significance of the frontier regions in defining and exemplifying many of the dilemmas that beset Myanmar. As van Schendel and de Maaker assert, “[t]he making of borders cannot be separated from attempts to define nations” (2014, p. 3).

Sunday (Aug 25) marked two years since hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, referred to as Bengali in Myanmar, fled from Rakhine State in Myanmar to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The plight of the Rohingya provides us a way of understanding the nature of exclusion in Myanmar.

This article provides a summary of what has happened in the two years since the Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. It shows that for the issues of refugee camp conditions, repatriation, justice and resolution, the various actors are at an impasse.

Myanmar’s 2014 census provides a fascinating case for examining sensitivities surrounding the conduct of a census particularly in a society where ethnicity is highly politicised. Using accounts and anecdotes about how the census was conducted, this article describes disagreements over ethnic classifications and labels, and considers the politics of counting and being counted in ethnically-charged Myanmar.

A new narrative has emerged describing how criminal gangs and traffickers are taking advantage of the chaos and poverty during flight and in Bangladesh’s refugee camps to traffic Rohingya women and children for sexual and labour exploitation. We identify the attributes of this latest narrative, its origins, and its implications for public and international policy. We ask the following questions. What is the nature of the threat that trafficking poses to displaced Rohingya? How many cases of trafficking have occurred and what are the circumstances surrounding these cases? Should we be concerned about the scale of this phenomenon?

The repatriation of Rohingya refugees (referred to as Bengali in Myanmar) from Bangladesh to Myanmar was slated to begin on 23 January but has been postponed by the Bangladesh government amid concerns about the repatriation procedures and the unwillingness of the refugees to return. Beyond these, there are several issues that still need to be addressed by the Myanmar government before a safe and voluntary return can occur.

Taking food assistance as its starting point, this article examines the underlying system of ideas that the Bangladeshi government and humanitarian organizations have about the term ‘refugee’. Through a consideration of refugee coping strategies, host government responses and humanitarian organizations’ operations on food assistance, I show that the provision of food aid is not just an apolitical act of assistance but also one which is embedded in relations of power that are continually (re)produced through laws, practice and discourse. In the conclusion, I offer some thoughts on the social construction of the term ‘refugee’ and its implications for the lives of refugees in Bangladesh.

In the refugee camps in Bangladesh, there is a common saying that the choice between living in Myanmar or fleeing to refugee camps in Bangladesh is akin to that between a crocodile and a snake. Almost 900 000 Rohingya, or Bengali as they are referred to in Myanmar, have sought refuge in Bangladesh. The majority fled after insurgent attacks on police stations and border guards, and subsequent military operations in Rakhine State, Myanmar at the end of August last year. The conditions in Bangladesh are squalid and bleak, with 90 per cent of the refugees dependent on food assistance and a considerable number living in makeshift shelters.

The instinctive response of the Bangladesh government to the influx of refugees is anxiety - over national security, diplomatic relations with Myanmar, domestic political stability and the economic burden of hosting so many refugees. Consequently, as this article shows, it controls and surveilles the refugees through biometric identification and encampment.

Tensions in western Rakhine State, Myanmar have escalated to a potential tipping point. This past weekend, 30 police posts and an army base were attacked by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), resulting in the death of more than 100 people, mostly militants. This comes on the heels of a spate of militant-initiated killings and attacks that began in October 2016, against a backdrop pf decades of state and military suppression of separatism and communal violence.

As of 19 November, 621,199 Rohingya, referred to as Bengali in Myanmar, have joined approximately 200,000 other Rohingya in Bangladesh as refugees. This latest exodus began at the end of August, after the insurgent group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, attacked police posts and the Burmese army conducted countermeasures in northern Rakhine State.

The maelstrom of militant attacks, civilian reprisals and government security crackdowns in western Rakhine, Myanmar has brought about another surge of Rohingya arrivals, or Bengalis as the local population calls them, in Bangladesh. It has been reported that almost 90 000 have crossed into Bangladesh, with between 18 000 and 28 000 having been permitted entry; the rest were turned away. Some have returned to Bangladesh despite being refused entry, and/or are squatting in an area beyond the boundary guarded by Bangladesh’s Border Guard.

This article argues that the two fundamental issues of citizenship for the Rohingya in Myanmar and safe migration channels need to be addressed by Myanmar and the countries in the region. Before elaborating on this, a summary of the adversity and perils the Rohingya face in Myanmar and on their migration journey is presented. Next, the measures taken by Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia - prosecuting the traffickers and providing temporary shelter - are considered.

The future of refugees in Thailand is more uncertain now than ever before. Myanmar’s political and economic reforms remain a work in progress but at the same time, the Thai government is applying subtle pressure on the refugees to return to Myanmar voluntarily.

Thailand’s track record vis-a-vis boat arrivals leaves much to be desired. In previousyears, Thai authorities have intercepted boats and pushed them back out to sea. At best,they provided them with food and water. At worst, they beat the passengers and deprivedthem of provisions before setting them adrift, as documented in 2009. Many who man-aged to land on Thai shores were deported back to Myanmar after being held in detention centres.

The sectarian violence that erupted in Rakhine (Arakan) state in Myanmar in the middle of this year has prompted heated discussions over ethnicity, citizenship and belonging. Subsequently, in an effort to determine accurate numbers for the different communities liv-ing in Pauktaw Township in Rakhine state, a fortnight-long registration exercise was con-ducted by government authorities in November.

The uncertain plight of more than 140,000 refugees living in camps along the Thai-Myanmar border has become even more precarious. On April 11, Thailand's National Security Council chief Tawin Pleansri announced that the closure of the refugee camps was imminent. He added that the National Security Council, the institution that has overall authority over refugee issues, is in discussions with the Myanmar government and in contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) about repatriating the refugees to Myanmar.